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MIRACLES, TRUST, AND ENNUI  
IN BARNES‘ PREDICTIVISM 
P.D. MAGNUS 
ABSTRACT: Eric Barnes‘ The Paradox of Predictivism is concerned primarily with two 
facts: predictivism (the fact that novel predictions play an important part in scientific 
confirmation) and pluralism (the fact that scientific development is not just a matter of 
isolated individuals judging the truth, but at least partly a matter of trusting legitimate 
experts). In the middle part of the book, he peers through these two lenses at the tired 
realist scarecrow of the no-miracles argument. He attempts to reanimate this weather-
worn realist argument, contra suggestions by people like me that it should be 
abandoned. In this paper, I want to get clear on Barnes‘ contribution to the debate. He 
focuses on what he calls the miraculous endorsement argument, which explains not the 
success of a specific theory but instead the history of successes for an entire research 
program. The history of successes is explained by reliable and improving methods, 
which are the flipside of approximately true background theories. Yet, as Barnes notes, 
the whole story must begin with methods that are at least minimally reliable. Barnes 
demands that the realist explain the origin of the minimally reliable take-off point, and 
he suggests a way that the realist might do so. I contend that his explanation still relies 
on contingent developments and so fails to completely explain the development of take-
off theories. However, this line of argument digs into familiar details of the no-miracles 
argument and overlooks what‘s new in Barnes‘ approach. By calling attention to 
pluralism, he reminds us that we need an account of scientific expertise. This is 
important, I suggest, because expertise is not indefinite. We do not trust specific experts 
for everything, but only for things within the bounds of their expertise. Drawing these 
boundaries relies on our own background theories and is only likely to be reliable if our 
background theories are approximately true. I argue, then, that pluralism gives us reason 
to be realists (about some things).  
KEYWORDS: scientific realism, prediction, predictivism, 
expertise, Eric Barnes, no-miracles argument 
 
1 The no-miracles argument 
To put it crudely, the familiar no-miracles argument (NMA) is this: Science is 
remarkably successful. If our theories were not true, then this success would be an 
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inexplicable miracle. Contrarwise, the success could be explained by the truth of 
our theories. So our theories are (probably, approximately) true. 
Barnes notes that the no-miracles argument, in casual presentations like this 
one, is ambiguous. One interpretation, which he dubs the ‗miraculous theory‘ 
argument, explains the success of a particular theory T in terms of the truth of T. I 
am sympathetic with Barnes‘ reasons for rejecting the miraculous theory 
argument,1 and the arguments I have elsewhere given against the NMA most 
readily apply to the miraculous theory argument.2 I will not rehearse these reasons 
here. Rather, I will set the miraculous theory argument aside. 
The other interpretation, which Barnes dubs the ‗miraculous endorsement‘ 
argument, is concerned with the success of scientific practice in general. It 
roughly takes this form: Scientists make predictions which are verified. If these 
scientists were merely guessing or accommodating prior evidence, then this 
success would be an inexplicable miracle. Contrarwise, this success could be 
explained by scientists‘ general reliability. So scientists are (probably, mostly) 
reliable. The reliability of their methods only makes sense if scientists‘ background 
theories are true. So those background theories are (probably, approximately) 
true.3 
The miraculous endorsement argument is not about a particular theory T. 
Rather, it is about the ability of scientists to develop theories like T. It explains 
their ability in terms of the general reliability of their methods and the truth of 
their background theories. This strategy shifts attention away from specific, 
isolated theories and towards the background theories which underwrite scientific 
methods. 
Moreover, it leads first to the conclusion that scientists are reliable experts 
and only from there to the truth of theories. As Barnes explains, ―novel success is 
not direct evidence of theory truth — it is rather evidence for the credibility of 
the endorser. More specifically, it is evidence for the truth or empirical adequacy 
                                 
1 Eric Christian Barnes, The Paradox of Predictivism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), esp. 132–136. 
2 P.D. Magnus, Craig Callender, ―Realist ennui and the base rate fallacy,‖ Philosophy of Science 
71, 3 (2004): 320–338. 
3 As Barnes acknowledges, Boyd has long championed the miraculous endoresement argument; 
see e.g. Richard Boyd, ―Scientific realism and naturalistic epistemology,‖ PSA: Proceedings of 
the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association (1980) Volume 2, 1982, 613–662. 
Lipton also draws the connection between reliable methods and true background theories; see 
e.g. Peter Lipton, ―Is the best good enough?,‖ in The Philosophy of Science, ed. David Papineau 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 93–106. 
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of the endorser‘s background beliefs.‖4 Note that, in this passage, he is still 
allowing for the possibility that predictive success might just be explained by the 
empirical adequacy of background theories. He thinks that making it an argument 
for realism requires solving two problems — what dubs ‗the problem of take-off 
theories‘ and ‗the anti-realist challenge.‘5 In the next section, I discuss the problem 
of take-off theories. In the subsequent section, I discuss the anti-realist challenge. 
Barnes‘ miraculous endorsement argument, situated as it is in a book about 
predictivism, ultimately yields a conclusion about predictivism — viz., that an 
anti-realist cannot be a predictivist. In the final section, I evaluate this claim. 
2 The problem of take-off theories 
The miraculous endorsement argument offers us a picture of science which begins 
with modestly reliable methods, uses them to generate approximately true 
theories, embodies the theories in more reliable methods, generates better 
theories… and so on. With each cycle, the methods become more reliable and the 
theories closer to the truth. Looking at the story in explanatory rather than 
historical order: The success of present theories can be explained by the reliability 
of present methods, which in turn is explained the approximate truth of previous 
theories, which is explained by the more modest reliability of previous methods… 
and so on. 
This story presumes that, in the primordial days of urscience, there were 
some methods that were at least a little bit reliable that embodied theories which 
were at least in the neighborhood of truth. Boyd calls this a ‗take-off point‘, ―a 
point in the development of the relevant scientific discipline at which the 
accepted background theories are sufficiently approximately true and 
comprehensive.‖6 For Boyd, it is a contingent matter that past science reached a 
take-off point. Barnes insists, however, that the realist owes us an explanation of 
how this could happen. Without such an explanation, the realist story about 
increasing reliability involves a miracle at the very beginning. The worry is that 
Boyd ―provides no account of the emergence of take-off theories that is clearly 
miracle-free [and so he] cannot claim to win the miraculous endorsement 
argument for realism: he has simply buried the miracle in the emergence of take-
off theories.‖7  
                                 
4 Barnes, The Paradox of Predictivism, 140. 
5 Barnes, The Paradox of Predictivism, 145–147. 
6 Boyd, ―Scientific realism and naturalistic epistemology,‖ 627. 
7 Barnes, The Paradox of Predictivism, 146. 
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The realist can answer this worry, Barnes suggests, only by showing that 
take-off theories are motivated by standards to which everyone — realist or not — 
is committed. These pre-theoretic standards show how initial methods were at 
least a little bit reliable. In the metaphor, they provide the launching pad for the 
take-off theories. So, Barnes insists, ―the realist must argue that take-off theories 
were assessed as plausible on some basis that was not itself theory laden — but was 
nonetheless truth conducive.‖8 Barnes suggests that simplicity judgements, 
suitably understood, serve as such a standard. 
Barnes discusses the example of William Bateson, important promulgator of 
Mendelian genetics. Bateson believed Mendelism because he was committed to 
using artificial breeding as a method for studying heredity, to specific techniques 
of numerical analysis, and because Mendelian genetics made the most sense of 
these data. Barnes maintains that these commitments were ―not… based on 
Bateson‘s acceptance of any scientific theory of his day.‖9 Barnes continues, 
―Neither the experiments that were designed, not the observations that these 
biologists made, nor the inference to the Mendelian explanation itself were 
critically dependent on the acceptance of anything that deserves to be called a 
scientific theory.‖10 According to Barnes, these experimental and methodological 
commitments provided an independent ground for the take-off theory. 
I want to consider two objections to Barnes‘ argument. 
First, he relies too much on the distinction between what ―deserves to be 
called a theory‖ and what does not. Admittedly, the use of artificial breeding to 
discover the nature of heredity did not depend on Bateson‘s acceptance of 
Mendelian genetics. If it was shared by Bateson and all his interlocutors, then 
indeed it was not based on any specific scientific theory of his day. Nevertheless, 
the reliability of the method is contingent. We can easily imagine a world in 
which it fails. Imagine a world of disjunctive heredity, for example, in which 
creatures in the wild reproduce by entirely different means than creatures in 
cages. If we demand an explanation for the modest reliability of methods used in 
crafting take-off theories — lest it be a miracle — then we must demand an 
explanation for the reliability of Bateson‘s method. 
                                 
8 Barnes, The Paradox of Predictivism, 148. Of course, showing that we are all committed to 
some pre-theoretic standard is a step short of showing that the standard is truth conducive. 
Barnes recognizes this. He argues that anyone willing to apply the standard at the observable 
level should be willing to use them in inferences about unobervables; see the next section. 
9 Barnes, The Paradox of Predictivism, 150. 
10 Barnes, The Paradox of Predictivism, 150-1. 
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This regress is inevitable. Principles of scientific inference are ampliative, so 
the reliability of scientific methods is always contingent. For any method, the 
world could (logically) have made the method unreliable. So we can ask what it is 
about the actual world that makes the method reliable. One might reply by 
reconstructing scientific inferences without ampliative principles, as deductions 
from the phenomena. However, the reconstruction can only be accomplished by 
hiding the inductive risk in contingent premises. We can ask what it is that 
explains why those premises are true. 
Second, set the first objection aside for a moment and allow that some 
inference principles are so basic that their reliability does not require an 
explanation. It is still a contingent fact that scientists were committed to these 
rather than other standards. We can ask why Bateson and his contemporaries 
accepted methods of artificial breeding as a clue to heredity. 
Suppose that one did explain why Bateson accepted it, why another 
scientist accepted it, why a third did, and so on. This would explain, for each 
scientist, why that scientist accepted the primordial method. If some of them came 
to accept it for different reasons, then there would still be a puzzle. The 
explanandum is their agreement, why these diverse causal processes should lead 
them all to accept this same method.11 
This worry turns on a familiar point about explanation: Any explanans can 
become an explanandum. For any fact, we can ask — why that?  The requirement 
Barnes puts on realist is that, for any take-off theory, we explain the take-off 
point. Barnes explains Bateson‘s commitment to Mendelian genetics in terms of 
Bateson‘s extra-Mendelian commitments, and he is satisfied to stop there. We can 
ask — why are these commitments reliable?  why was Bateson committed to 
them?  
Any specific explanatory story that the realist offers must stop somewhere. 
Where it stops, it relies on a contingent and unexplained explanans. If these still 
count as miracles in a way that undoes the no-miracles argument, then the no-
miracles argument necessarily fails. Yet talk of miracles can be misleading here. 
The realist begins with a the present success of science taken altogether (a seeming 
miracle that requires explanation), explains it in terms of prior science (less 
miraculous), which in turn is explain in terms of science before that, and so on. 
The realist story will still end in some contingent fact, but something more like a 
                                 
11 This is like the well-worn example of explaining the hair colour of the members of the Red 
Hair Society. The individual explanation for each red-haired member is different than the group 
explanation of synchromaticity. 
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coincidence than a miracle. Some coincidences neither require nor admit of 
explanation. 
Arguably, common sense involves commitment to some basic rules of 
evidence. For example, what visually appears to be the case under good viewing 
conditions should be taken to be actually so. Refusal to accept basic commitments 
like these is tantamount to embracing scepticism. However, the commitments that 
Barnes appeals to as take-off points are not primordial rules of this kind. One 
might insist that artificial breeding is no clue to heredity in nature without 
thereby sliding into scepticism. This is not just a shortcoming of Barnes‘ example, 
either. No scientific advance could possibly be explained just in terms of universal, 
common sense rules, because an advance is something that previous thinkers had 
not hit upon yet. The contingencies which make the advance possible are 
themselves potential explananda. 
So I think the realist should refuse Barnes‘ challenge to explain the take-off 
point of take-off theories. Rather, the realist should insist that science began in 
contingency. It involved a little bit of luck. 
3 The anti-realist challenge 
If I am right, then the problem of take-off theories is actually a non-problem. The 
realist story begins, in the days of primordial science, with methods that are at 
least a little bit reliable and theories that are at least in the neighborhood of truth. 
The realist may take that minimal starting point as a happy thing that does not 
itself require explanation in terms of earlier reliability or earlier truth. Even 
granting such a starting point, however, an anti-realist might insist that the early 
methods were empirical and the early truths were observable. The anti-realist 
may further insist that long climb of science has not been about the refinement of 
reliable methods and more precise truths, but about the refinement of empirical 
methods and empirically-adequate theories. This insistence is what Barnes calls 
the anti-realist challenge. 
Barnes‘ reply begins by noting that, for claims about observables, there is no 
difference between truth and empirical adequacy. To believe that ‗I am eating a 
sandwich‘ is true is no different than believing that observable things like a 
sandwich are such as if it were true. This means that the anti-realist and the realist 
form beliefs in the same way throughout the observable domain. The anti-realist 
employs judgements of simplicity (for example) to conclude from scat and 
chittering noises that there is an unseen mouse in the wainscoting. If we continue 
to employ such judgements, they lead beyond beliefs in observable things to 
beliefs in the unobservable. Just as we believe in unseen mice on the basis of 
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observed mouse evidence, we should believe in unseen electrons on the basis 
observed electron evidence. 
Barnes characterizes this as the move from horizontal inference (inferring 
from observables to other observables) to vertical inference (inferring from 
observables to unobservables). It is, in Barnes‘ words, ―the oldest argument for 
realism in the book‖12 and a ―venerable realist tradition.‖13 It is what Philip 
Kitcher calls the ‗Galilean Strategy.‘14  
I have responded elsewhere to Kitcher‘s version of the argument.15 The gist 
of my objection is this: Suppose the anti-realist has no good reason to deny that 
judgements of simplicity which are legitimate for horizontal inference are also 
legitimate for vertical inference. This does not show that the anti-realist must or 
even should accept this extension. The realist claims that these principles of 
judgement start out applying both to observables and unobservables, and so the 
realist sees the anti-realist as unjustifiably stifling them. Yet the anti-realist claims 
that these principles start out applying to observables, and so the anti-realist sees 
the realist as unjustifiably exploding them. 
When we are talking about judgements of simplicity, inference to the best 
explanation, or success-to-truth inferences, this debate amounts to nothing more 
than the realist and anti-realist starting from different places. This is not so much 
an argument for realism as it is a hymn which is comforting to realists. The anti-
realist is free to think that simple explanations or successful theories do not form 
homogenous classes, and so insist that there is no positive reason to extrapolate 
from the ones that do not invoke unobservable entities to those that do. 
The problem is not that the horizontal-to-vertical move is necessarily a bad 
inference pattern. It just requires, as a premise, that the horizontal and vertical 
cases are relevantly similar. An anti-realist refuses to accept the premise by 
refusing to presumptively see simplicity and explanation as stable mechanisms. 
Suppose instead we consider a specific instrument, like a microscope. A 
weak optical microscope can be used to look at things that sharp-eyed people can 
see without lenses, and the same instrument can be used to look at things that no 
one can discern unaided. The continuity of the instrument, the fact that it is the 
very same material object, gives us a positive reason to think that the two cases are 
                                 
12 Barnes, The Paradox of Predictivism, 153. 
13 Barnes, The Paradox of Predictivism, 156. 
14 Philip Kitcher, ―Real realism: The Galilean Strategy,‖ The Philosophical Review 110, 2 (2001): 
151–197. 
15 P. D. Magnus, ―Success, truth, and the Galilean Strategy,‖ The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 54, 3 (2003): 465–474. 
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similar. So we should rely on the instrument even for the things we could not 
check with our naked eyes. Once we have established a weak optical microscope, 
we can use the overlap with higher power microscopes to argue for beliefs about 
smaller and smaller things. We are not simply noting the absence of a specific 
reason to stop at the boundary of the observable, but providing a positive reason to 
move beyond it. This is an answer to the anti-realist for the specific unobservable 
things that are detectable under microscopes. 
The crucial factor here is the material continuity of the instrument. The 
instrument is the very same thing when pointed at observables or at 
unobservables, and so there is a positive reason to think that its reliability with the 
former extends to the latter. Plausibly, breeding as a clue to heredity exhibits the 
same kind of material continuity as microscopy as a clue to the very small. So 
perhaps we can give positive reasons — without begging the question in favor of 
realism — to believe Mendelian genetics. Obviously, spelling this out would 
require more work. 
4 The limits of expertise 
Taking a step back from the miraculous endorsement argument, we should 
recognize Barnes‘ concern with predictivism; i.e., with the claim that novel 
predictive success provides a special reason to accept a theory. Barnes argues that 
the anti-realist cannot be a predictivist. His argument has two parts and goes 
roughly like this: 
Begin by considering whether novel predictive success is ipso facto 
probative.16 The realist can say that it is. By way of the miraculous endorsement 
argument, the realist sees novel predictive success as a reason to believe that the 
predictors are experts — that is, that predictors have approximately true 
background theories. The anti-realist, however, has no reason to think of novel 
predictive success as anything more than just a theory‘s being empirically 
adequate in this instance. This particular success is no special reason to think that 
the theory is empirically adequate tout court. 
Yet novel predictive success might still be a reliable guide to other 
theoretical virtues.17 The view here is that ―accommodators are prone to endorse 
theories that are built to fit data in some disreputable way — either because such 
theories violate some extra-empirical criteria or because they incorporate ad hoc 
hypotheses that are insufficiently supported either by extra-empirical criteria or 
                                 
16 Barnes calls this ‗virtuous predictivism.‘ 
17 Barnes calls this ‗unvirtuous predictivism.‘ 
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empirical data.‖18 The realist, seeing extra-empirical criteria as truth indicative, 
will condemn such vicious accommodation as leading away from the truth. The 
anti-realist, seeing the extra-empirical criteria as merely pragmatic, can only 
condemn it as awkward. 
The first part of the argument seems right to me. The anti-realist should say 
that, although novel predictive success qua success is indicative of empirical 
adequacy, it has no special value qua novel. If this is counter-intuitive, it is no 
more counter-intuitive than many other aspects of anti-realism. 
The second part also seems right for an anti-realist who insists that criteria 
like simplicity can only be non-empirical and purely pragmatic. However, an anti-
realist can deny that such virtues are utterly extra-empirical. It is common19 to 
argue that complex theories over-fit by describing idiosyncrasies of a particular 
data set rather than describing the broader pattern. If a theory is simpler, then it is 
less likely to just describe the history of previously observed phenomena — and 
more likely to be adequate to unobserved phenomena. Similarly, a theory which 
makes successful novel predictions does not succeed just by being antecedently fit 
to those predictions. So predictive success similarly suggests that the theory is 
really empirically adequate rather than being fit just to the specific data set. This 
suggests a way that an anti-realist can be a predictivist. This means that an anti-
realists may accept a theory based on its novel predictive success. 
Still, this is different than the kind of predictivism Barnes advocates: that 
we should trust an expert based on her novel predictive success. Barnes suggests 
that an anti-realist cannot accept that kind of predictivism. 
His own case for this, as we have seen, goes by way of the miraculous 
endorsement argument. My criticisms of the argument threaten to sever this 
connection: In §2, I argued that the realist must resist the urge to explain the 
origins of every precondition for present science — even for the realist, the story 
must be looser than that. In §3, I argued that this amount of slack leaves the realist 
no way of overthrowing the anti-realist at the general level which does not 
illicitly rely on realist intuitions. These criticisms leave the anti-realist room to 
                                 
18 Barnes, The Paradox of Predictivism, 161. 
19 e.g. P.M. Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the 
Structure of Science (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989), 179–181; Malcolm R. Forster, Elliott 
Sober, ―How to tell when simpler, more unified, or less Ad Hoc theories will provide more 
accurate predictions,‖ The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1994): 1–35; 
Christopher Hitchcock, Elliott Sober, ―Prediction versus accommodation and the risk of 
overfitting,‖ The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55, 1 (2004), 1–34. 
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maneuver. I want to offer a somewhat different route to Barnes‘ conclusion, 
making use of the looser realist story. 
At the end of the last section, I observed that material instruments which 
are reliable when applied to observable things continue to be the same material 
thing when applied to unobservables. This continuity provides a positive reason to 
accept realist conclusions about the entities detected with these instruments, even 
if the general issue of realism versus anti-realism is a standoff. My further 
suggestion is that trusting an expert is like using an instrument. If we trust an 
expert on matters which we can check directly, then our trust in that expert 
means that we should respect their opinion about other matters as well. The point 
is not that anti-realists cannot antecedently accept expert-trusting predictivism, 
but that it would subsequently require them to abandon their anti-realism at least 
regarding the things about which experts can testify. 
The anti-realist may respond that trusting an expert is never a matter of 
unlimited trust. Even if I trust my doctor‘s medical opinion, I may not trust her 
opinion about cars or distant galaxies. So the anti-realist might try to trust experts 
only about observables. 
The anti-realist reply is correct insofar as expertise always has its limits. 
This is an aspect of expertise that is missing from Barnes‘ argument. The 
miraculous endorsement argument, as he presents it, lends the glow of truth to the 
predicting scientist. Yet it is a mistake to think that a scientific expert is a general 
purpose truth machine. When an elder physicist pontificates about vitamins or the 
recent election, we do not trust them to the same degree that we do when they 
talk about physics. 
To make this discrimination, we must be able to recognize the legitimate 
domain of a scientist‘s expertise — to separate physics from biomedicine and 
politics. The anti-realist may be able to do that much, because the phenomena of 
physics, medicine, and politics are very different. Yet we must also be able to parse 
expertise in more detail. An expert on viruses may be able to tell us quite a lot 
about viral infection, but should be less authoritative on bacterial infection, even 
though the difference between a viral and bacterial infection is not an observable 
or phenomenal difference. The difference is the kind of unobservable organisms 
that cause the trouble. As such, the anti-realist (qua anti-realist) will have trouble 
properly distinguishing the two domains of expertise. 
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Work by Frank Keil and others20 can be seen as supporting my argument. 
Even preschoolers see groups of experts as having authority that is defined and 
constrained by causal patterns in the world. In order to mark the boundaries of 
expertise, children and adults alike need to have some sense of how the world is 
causally structured into different domains. Keil et al. write: ―There are domain-
specific patterns in the world that experts know and use to understand a wide 
range of phenomena that arise from those patterns.‖21 The studies suggest that 
these patterns are often a matter of unobservable, internal features rather than 
observable, superficial features. So the assignment of expertise is most naturally 
understood in a realist way. 
Here the anti-realist might insist that following the advice of appropriate 
experts is a matter of doing rather than believing. We can distinguish bacterial 
from viral infections on the basis of some observable indicators, for example, and 
so one might try to exploit those indicators without believing anything about the 
unobservable difference that they reflect. Constructive empiricists are prepared to 
accept all the claims that realists are prepared to believe, where ‗acceptance‘ 
means acting as if it were so. That is, constructive empiricists will not believe but 
will act just as if they believed. If this distinction between belief and acceptance is 
tenable — if it is possible to act in every respect that matters as if you do believe 
something while nonetheless not believing it — then anti-realists can treat experts 
in just the way realists would. Yet the distinction begins to fray, both in general 
and specifically in this case. In general, it is not clear how non-belief that makes 
no practical difference actually differs from belief; it looks as if anti-realists really 
do believe, but are in denial about it. Moreover, the posture of mere acceptance 
runs afoul of how expertise actually works. The trust we place in experts is 
epistemic as well as prudential. What one does when trusting an expert is believe. 
The argument I am suggesting can be summarized in this way: Suppose that 
we trust experts who can make successful novel predictions. This trust is limited 
to their proper domain of expertise. In some cases, that domain can only be 
recognized by considering the unobservable objects of enquiry about which they 
are experts. So the trust cannot be merely a matter of accepting their 
                                 
20 Donna J. Lutz, Frank C. Keil, ―Early understanding of the division of cognitive labor,‖ Child 
Development 73, 4 (2002): 1073–1084, Frank C. Keil, ―Categorisation, causation, and the limits 
of understanding,‖ Language and Cognitive Processes 18, 5/6 (2003): 663–692, Frank C. Keil, 
Courtney Stein, Lisa Webb, Van D. Billings, and Leonid Rozenblit, ―Discerning the division of 
cognitive labor: An emerging understanding of how knowledge is clustered in other minds,‖ 
Cognitive Science 32, 2 (2008): 259–300. 
21 Keil et al., ―Discerning the division of cognitive labor,‖ 298. 
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proclamations as empirically adequate; that is, we end up committing ourselves to 
these unobservable objects. Therefore, an anti-realist must either give in to 
realism (with regard to specific unobservable entities) or deny the supposition of 
predictivism (as a general matter). 
Barnes uses the word ‗pluralism‘ to indicate the fact that scientific 
development is not just a matter of isolated individuals judging the truth, but at 
least partly a matter of trusting legitimate experts. In that terminology, the upshot 
of my argument is that thoroughgoing anti-realism is incompatible with pluralism. 
5 Conclusion 
Elsewhere, I‘ve drawn the distinction between wholesale arguments (which 
attempt to establish realism for all or most science) and retail arguments (which 
attempt to establish realism about specific kinds of things).22 
Barnes argues, on the basis of the miraculous endorsement argument, that 
we should think of the broad picture of the world offered by science as roughly 
correct. Because of the objections I raised earlier (§§2&3), I think it fails if we 
think of it as a wholesale argument. It could succeed as the strategy for a retail 
argument, but it is missing details. More needs to be said about how far expertise 
reaches and about how confident we ought to be in particular parts of scientists‘ 
background theories. 
Nevertheless, the miraculous endorsement argument is enlightening 
because it makes the connection between predictivism and what Barnes‘ calls 
‗pluralism‘ — the fact that scientific practice involves trusting experts. I have 
suggested that limiting trust to an experts‘ domain of competence, as a pluralist 
must do, relies in part on claims about the unobservable world. So a pluralist and 
predictivist must be a realist with regard to those claims. Since I have only 
sketched the argument, however, I have not been able to say which claims those 
are. The answer will require a more detailed discussion of how expertise functions. 
The conclusion of it will be a limited realism, just about some specific things — so 
it will only be a retail argument. 
Reflecting on scientific practice, predictivism and pluralism almost seem 
like data with which we as philosophers of science must reckon. Barnes is right, I 
                                 
22 Magnus, Callender, ―Realist ennui and the base rate fallacy,‖ P. D. Magnus, ―Inductions, red 
herrings, and the best explanation for the mixed record of science,‖ The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 61, 4 (2010): 803–819. Barnes responds directly to issues raised by Craig 
Callender and me, specifically over whether base rate information is required to formulate the 
No Miracles Argument. Nothing I have said in this paper turns on base rates. 
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think, in arguing that reckoning with them will demolish monolithic anti-realism. 
Yet I think we ought to demolish monolithic positions generally. If we give up 
looking for a wholesale argument by which questions can be settled all together, 
we start the hard work of crafting retail arguments that can settle matters here 
and there. Predictivism and pluralism are promising clues to how we might 
construct some of them.23 
                                 
23 An earlier version of this paper was presented as part of a book symposium at the Philosophy 
of Science Association 2010 Biennial Meeting in Montreal. 
